We investigate the e¤ect of oil price innovations on the U.S. stock market using a model that nests symmetric and asymmetric responses to positive and negative oil price innovations. We …nd no evidence of asymmetry for aggregate stock returns, and only very limited evidence for 49 industry-level portfolios. Moreover, these asymmetries do not match up well with conventional views regarding energy-dependent sectors of the economy. Instead, asymmetries are more likely driven by the e¤ect of oil price innovations on expected and/or realized demand. We inquire whether the size of the shock matters in that doubling the size of the shock more (or less) than doubles the size of the response, …nding that the e¤ect of a 2.s.d innovation is just about double the magnitude of the impact of a 1.s.d innovation. Furthermore, we …nd no support for the conjecture that shocks that exceed a threshold have an asymmetric e¤ect on stock returns.
Introduction
Headlines such as "U.S. stocks plunge after oil climbs $6" (New York Times, June 11, 2008) or "U.S. stocks rally after crude drops to 3-month low" (Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2008 ) highlight the shared belief among journalists and stock market commentators that oil price shocks have a direct e¤ect on the U.S. stock market. Moreover, these headlines put in evidence the belief that the e¤ect might depend on the behavior of crude oil prices in the recent history, and suggest that the relationship between oil price shocks and stock returns might be nonlinear.
For many years, researchers compiled con ‡icting evidence regarding the nature of the relationship between changes in crude oil prices and stock returns. On the one hand, Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and Huang, Masulis and Stoll (1996) found no evidence of a negative relationship between prices of oil futures and stock returns. Similarly, Wei (2003) encountered that the oil price shock of 1973-74 had no impact on stock returns. On the other hand, work by Kling (1985) and Jones and Kaul (1996) pointed towards a negative e¤ect of oil price shocks on stock returns. Yet, in recent years, a consensus appears to have emerged among academics: oil price shocks exert a negative impact on most stock returns, though the nature of the relationship depends on the underlying shock. In particular, Kilian and Park (2009) …nd that oil price shocks that are driven by innovations to the precautionary demand for crude oil have a negative impact on U.S. stock returns. They show that the response di¤ers signi…cantly depending on the source of the oil price shock (e.g., supply or demand driven). Thus, changes in the composition of oil price shocks over time help explain why, in the past, researchers failed to …nd evidence in favor of an e¤ect of oil price innovations on U.S. stock returns. 2 An alternative explanation for these contrasting results could stem from the possibly nonlinear nature of the relationship between stock returns and oil price shocks. For instance, if people's perception of the importance of an oil price shock depends on the past history of oil prices (Hamilton 1996 (Hamilton , 2003 , or if …rms'cash ‡ows respond di¤erently to positive and negative oil price innovations, then the e¤ect of an oil price shock on stock returns will also depend on the size and the sign of the shock.
There are a number of reasons why oil price shocks could have an asymmetric, and possibly nonlinear, e¤ect on stock returns. First, oil prices do not appear to have an asymmetric e¤ect on aggregate real GDP (Kilian and Vigfusson 2011a, b) and aggregate industrial production (Herrera, Lagalo, and Wada 2011). Yet, they seem to have an asymmetric e¤ect on some (but not all) industries that use energy intensively in their production process such as rubber and plastics, or in consumption such as transportation equipment (Herrera, Lagalo and Wada 2011). On the other hand, some of the industries that exhibit asymmetric response patterns are not energy intensive at all, contradicting conventional explanations of asymmetries. Asymmetries in the response of production could translate into an asymmetric response of pro…ts and, thus, stock returns.
In addition, the optimal decision for a …rm that pays dividends to its shareholders and seeks to maximize the expected present value of its dividends (without closing), could be to pay dividends only when its surplus exceeds a threshold (Wan 2007 ). Therefore, a negative (or a positive) oil price innovation could push the surplus below the cuto¤ required to pay dividends for an oil company (or an industry that uses energy intensively).
If that is the case, the company could choose not to pay dividends and face a decline in stock prices. The negative impact that such a decision would 3 have on stock returns is likely to be larger than the increase in stock returns that would stem from higher dividend payments due to a larger surplus.
Another possibility is that uncertainty and …nancial stress brought about by the oil price shock, could lead to asymmetries in the response of interest rates (Ferderer 1996 ; Balke, Brown and Yücel 2002) and, in turn, on the expected present discounted value of the dividends and stock returns. Such an e¤ect would also be evident if people believed the monetary authority will respond di¤erently to oil price increases and decreases. For instance, Ferderer (1996) Unlike our model, theirs decomposes unexpected oil price changes into oil supply, aggregate demand and oil-speci…c demand shocks. The structural VAR they estimate is given by
where z t contains the percentage change in global crude oil production, a measure of real activity in global industrial commodity markets, the real price of oil, and the U.S. stock market variable of interest (e.g., aggregate stock returns or industry-level stock returns), in that order. Then, they use a standard Choleski decomposition to identify the deep structural -oil supply, aggregate demand and oil-speci…c demand-shocks. In other words, they impose the assumption that there is no contemporaneous feedback 1 Estimating a higher dimensional semi-structural model while simultaneously controlling for data mining would not be feasible within a year of continuously operating all our computation resources. Note that we are already using a cluster to execute our computations. 2 To assess whether oil price innovations have an asymmetric e¤ect on U.S. stock returns, we use three di¤erent nonlinear transformations of the real oil price, o t . The …rst nonlinear transformation is a modi…ed version of Mork's (1989) proposal to split percent changes in oil prices into increases and decreases to allow for an asymmetric response of stock returns to positive and negative oil price shocks. That is, we use the oil price increase, which is de…ned as:
Alternatively, Hamilton (1996 Hamilton ( , 2003 suggests that agents might react in a di¤erent manner if the oil price increase constitutes a correction for a previous decline and not an increase in a previously stable environment. To account for this behavior, he proposes to use the net oil price increase as a measure of oil price shocks. Thus, as a second nonlinear transformation of oil prices we use the net oil price increase relative to the previous 12-month maximum (Hamilton 1996) , which is given by:
The last measure is the net oil price increase over the previous 36-month maximum (Hamilton 2003) , which is de…ned in a similar manner:
Although, the last two measures do not have a direct grounding on economic theory, there are behavioral explanations as to why agents might react di¤erently in the face of a positive shock if oil prices have been stable in the near past or if they only represent a correction for a previous decline.
In fact, the headlines reported in the news often suggest that analysts and stock market commentators consider the behavior of oil prices in the recent past when thinking about the impact of shocks on stock returns.
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Returns
To evaluate the e¤ect of positive and negative oil price innovations on stock returns we use a simultaneous equation model that nests both symmetric and asymmetric responses of stock returns. In addition, the nonlinear nature of this model allows for small and large oil price innovations to have di¤erent e¤ects on the stock market. Thus, consider the data generating process for each of the stock return series, y i;t ; to be given by the following dynamic simultaneous equation model:
where x t is the log growth of the crude oil price at time t, y i;t j is the return on the i th portfolio at time t, x # t is one of the nonlinear transformations of oil prices described in the previous section, and " 1t and " 2t are, by construction, orthogonal disturbances. That is, for identi…cation purposes, we assume that oil price changes are predetermined with respect to U.S. stock returns. This identi…cation strategy is common in the literature on the relationship between oil price shocks and economic activity and amounts to assuming that there is no contemporaneous feedback from U.S. That is, we …rst calculate the impulse response functions to a positive innovation, I y (h; ; t ), and to a negative innovation, I y (h; ; t ) of size -conditional on the history t -for h = 0; 1; 2; :::; 12. We perform this computation for 1,000 di¤erent histories and then calculate the unconditional impulse response functions, I y (h; ) ; by averaging over all the histories. That is, we use the impulse response functions computed in the previous section to construct a Wald test of the null hypothesis:
I y (h; ) = I y (h; ) for h = 0; 1; 2; :::; 12:
Note that this test jointly evaluates whether the response of stock returns (for a particular portfolio) to a positive shock of size equals the negative of the response to a negative shock of the same size, ; for horizons h = 0; 1; 2; :::; 12: Our motivation for focusing on a one-year horizon is twofold.
First, the extant literature on the e¤ect of oil price shocks has found that the largest and most signi…cant impact on economic activity takes place around a year after the shock (see, for instance, Hamilton and Herrera 2004). Therefore, one could conjecture a similar lag in the transmission of oil price shocks to dividends, and thus to stock returns. But, even in the case where …nancial investors rapidly incorporate the information regarding oil price changes in their expected dividends, since the Wald test is a joint test for horizons h = 0; 1; 2; :::; 12, we take into account the response at shorter horizons.
Second, by focusing on the 12-months horizon we mitigate issues of data mining related to repeating the test over a di¤erent number of horizons.
That is, if we were to repeat the impulse response based test with a 5% size say for 6 di¤erent horizons H; then the probability of …nding at least one rejection would exceed 5% under the null.
Having addressed the possible issue of data mining across horizons by focusing on H = 12, we still have to tackle data mining concerns related to repeating the impulse response based test over 49 di¤erent portfolios.
To avoid this potential problem, we compute data-mining robust critical values by simulating the distribution of the supremum of the bootstrap test statistic, under the null, across all portfolios for each of the oil price transformations. 6 To compute the data mining robust critical values we generate 100 pseudo-series using the estimated coe¢ cient for the 49 portfolios in model (5) . We then use 100 histories to get the conditional impulse response functions for each pseudo-series and compute the IRF s by Monte Carlo integration. We repeat this procedure 100 times to obtain the empirical distribution of the test statistic.
Before we review the test results it is worth noting that the Finding asymmetries in the response of aircraft, or apparel might not be surprising to the reader, as the use of transportation equipment requires considerable amounts of re…ned products and apparel is somewhat energy intensive in production (see Table 2 ). Thus, a-priori, one could anticipate the demand for these goods to contract more in response to positive oil price innovations than it would expand when faced by negative innovations. After all, …rms might postpone the purchases of planes when hit by an unexpected oil price surge, but they might not increase their demand when faced by an unexpected price drop. As a consequence, one would expect the response of 19 pro…ts, and thus stock returns, to be asymmetric. Yet, by the same token, we would expect to …nd asymmetries in automobiles and truck, but none is evident. On the contrary, evidence of asymmetry in candy & soda as well as in insurance might be more puzzling as the total (direct and indirect) cost of crude petroleum and natural gas used to produce a dollar of output in these industries is less than 4 cents (see Table 2 and the negative of the IRF s to a negative innovation of the same size. 7 The second panel of Table 1 reports the p values for the test of symmetry in the response to a 2 s.d. innovation.
Figure 2 about here
At …rst glance, it would appear that doubling the size of the innovation increases the evidence in favor of asymmetry (see Figure 2 and the second panel of Table 1 ). Note how there are more p values below 5%, which are marked in bold, for a 2 s.d. innovation than for a 1 s.d. innovation.
Yet, this is not the case when we control for data mining. In fact, using Let us de…ne
where x t is the percentage change in the oil price, and equals one (6.83%) or two (13.66%) standard deviations of the oil price change.
The fourth column in the left and right panels of Table 1 
Conclusions
We started our study by inquiring whether the size and the sign of an oil sive at all suggests that mechanisms other than the transmission through a production channel are at play. On the other hand, our …nding of asymmetries in aircraft, apparel, candy & soda, and insurance suggests that an asymmetric response of the demand for these goods might be the source of these patterns. Now, whether changes in demand are driven because consumers perceive oil prices to be higher than in the recent past (i.e., the behavioral explanation) or whether the decline in demand is driven by increased precautionary savings or shifts in demand, is an issue that should be explored by future research.
Do sign and size matter? The answer to this question appears to be that sign only matters in that it determines the direction of the e¤ect on stock returns but -for the aggregate and most industry-level returns-it has no impact on the magnitude of the response. As for the size of the shock, given that in most cases the responses are symmetric, the e¤ect of a two standard 25 deviation shock is just twice the e¤ect of a one standard deviation shock.
In brief, our results suggest a linear model provides a good approximation to the response of real stock returns to real oil price innovations. . Bold and italics denote signi…cance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. ** and * denote signi…cance at the 5% and 10%, respectively, after accounting for data mining. . Squar es re pres ent s ignific anc e at the 5% lev el .
26
x # t = x 1 t x # t = x 12 t x # t = x 36 t x # t = x sd t x # t = x 1 t x # t = x 12 t x # t = x 36 t x # t =
